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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
MARY PIERREN, 
Plaintiff 
Respondent, 
-vs-
Defendant 
Appellant. 
Case No. 16802 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
This action was filed with the Utah Supreme 
Court seeking judicial review and reversal of the decision 
of Judge Calvin Gould of the District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah, dated October 3, 1979. Appellant's 
brief was filed with the Court on April 4, 1980 and the 
brief of the respondent and cross-appellant was filed on 
June 6, 1980. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant makes no exception to the statement 
of facts set forth in respondent's brief. However, it should 
be noted that appellant mistakenly stated on page 24 of her 
brief that she was legally divorced from her husband at 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Service  and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the time of her original application for AFDC assistance. 
(Appendix A) At the time of this application, appellant 
was separated from Pierre Pierren but was not legally 
divorced until July 26, 1976. Appellant was legally 
divorced from Pierre Pierren at the time she signed the 
reapplication forms referred to in the brief. (Appendices 
B and C) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SUBSEQUENT CASES MODIFYING 
THE KING V. SMITH DECISION 
CITED IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ESTABLISH THAT THE STATE OF 
UTAH WAS REQUIRED TO PROVE THAT 
APPELLANT'S EX-HUSBAND WAS 
ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTING TO HER 
HOUSEHOLD. 
Respondent in its brief cites the United States 
Supreme Court decision of King v. Smith, 39 2 u. s. 309 (1968) 
as supporting the proposition that the mere presence of 
appellant's ex-husband, Pierre Pierren, in her home rendered 
her household ineligible for AFDC assistance. Following its 
decision in King v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court 
had further opportunity to consider the relevant AFDC 
regulations in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970). In this 
case, the Court considered whether a regulation adopted by 
the Department of Heal th, Education and Welfare (HEW) providii 
in part, that where a man is ceremonially married to an AFOC 
mother but is not the realor adoptive father, his income may 
not be treated as available to the children unless he is 
legally obligated to support t"~~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The regulation considered and approved by the Court presently 
provides: 
A State plan under title IV-A of the 
Social Security Act shall provide 
that: 
(1) The determination whether a child 
has been deprived of parental support 
or care by reason of the death, continued 
absence from the home, or physical or 
mental.incapacity of a parent .•. will be 
made only in relation to the child's 
natural or adoptive parent, or in 
relation to the child's stepparent who 
is ceremonially married to the child's 
natural or adoptive parent and is legally 
obligated to support the child under State 
law of general applicability which re-
quires stepparents to support stepchildren 
to the same extent that natural or adoptive 
parents are required to support their 
children. Under this requirement, the 
inclusion in the family, or the presence 
in the home, of a "substitute parent" or 
"man-in-the-house" or any individual 
other than one described in this paragraph 
is not an acceptable basis for a finding 
of ineligibility of income by the State, 
nor may the State agency prorate or other-
wise reduce the money amount for any need 
item included in the standard on the 
basis of assumed contributions for non-
legally responsible individuals living 
in the household. 
In establishing financial eligibility 
and the amount of the assistance payment, 
only such net income as is actually 
available for current use on a regular 
basis will be considered, and the income 
only of the parent described in the first 
sentence of this paragraph will be 
considered available for children in 
the household in the absence of proof 
of actual contributions. 45 C.F.R. §233.90 
(a) (1). 
In approving the HEW regulations, the Court held: 
In the absence of proof of actual 
contribution, California may not 
consider the child's "resources" Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to include either the income of 
a nonadopting stepfather who is 
not legally obligated to support 
the child as is a natural parent, 
or the income of a MARS (man 
assuming the role of spouse)-
whatever the nature of his obliga-
tion to support. Lewis v. Martin, 
supra., at 559-60. 
Another case in point is VanLare v. Hurley, 421 
U.S. 338 (1975). In this case, petitioners were AFDC mother 
who brought an action challenging the reduction of their 
shelter allowance by New York State Officials on the basis 
that petitioners had allowed a person not a recipient of 
AFDC and who had no legal obligation to support the petitiorn 
family to reside in the household. The New York regulations 
in question reduced pro-rata the shelter allowance of an 
AFDC recipient to the extent that nonpaying lodgers were 
living in the household. After reviewing the King v. Smith 
and Lewis v. Martin cases, the Supreme Court held the New 
York regulations to be invalid, stating: 
Thus under the New York regulations 
the nonpaying lodger's mere presence 
results in a decrease in benefits. 
Yet the lodger, like the Alabama 
"substitute father" or the California 
"MARS," may be contributing nothing 
to the needy child. King v. Smith, 
supra, and Lewis v. Martin, supra, 
construe the federal law and regula-
tions as barring the States from 
assuming that nonlegally responsible 
persons will apply their resources 
to aid the welfare child. Those 
cases therefore compel a reversal 
of the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. VanLare v. Hurley, supra., 
at 346-47. 
In view of the lwldings in the two previously Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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cited cases, .it is especially important to note that appellant's 
ex-husband, Pierre Pierren, was not the natural father of 
two of the children listed in appellant's application, 
dated April 2, 1976. The two children, Timothy H. Rodriquez 
and Larry D. Rodriquez, were from appellant's previous 
marriage with Larry D. Rodriquez, Sr. {Appendix E) Appellant 
ex-husband, Pierre Pierren1had not adopted the two Rodriquez 
children nor did state law at the time require him to provide 
for their support as a stepparent. Even assuming arguendo 
that Pierre Pierren was in appellant's home during the time 
period in question, under the United States Supreme Court 
decision note~ it cannot be assumed that Pierre Pierren was 
actually making contributions to the support of the children 
unless respondent can show that "the bread (was) actually 
set on the table". Lewis v. Martin, supra., at 559. Based 
on respondent's answer to appellant's Interrogatory No. 26 
stating that it was not alleging that appellant's former 
husband was providing support or money payments to her 
children (Record, at 10) and on the fact that no evidence 
was presented by respondent at trial of "actual contributions" 
it should, at least, be concluded that respondent cannot be 
permitted to recover the portion of AFDC asistance paid to 
appellant for the support of the two Rodriquez children. 
This portion is one-half of the amount claimed or $2,040.00. 
In addition, Lewis v. Martin also provides 
some support for the conclusion that respondent cannot 
presume that appellant's ex-husband, Pierre Pierren, was 
maki~g actual constributions. The Court stated in part: Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Our decision in King v. Smith held 
only that a legal obligation to sup-
port was a necessary condition for 
qualification as a "parent"; it did 
not also suggest that it would always 
be a sufficient condition. We find 
nothing in this regulation to suggest 
inconsistency with the Act's basic 
purpose of providing aid to "needy" 
children, except where there is a 
"breadwinner" in the house who can 
be expected to provide such aid 
himself. 
Even assuming Pierre Pierren was in appellant's 
home, it is evident from the record that he was not a 
"breadwinner" nor could he reasonably be expected to provide 
aid to the family. To allow respondent to recover the 
amount sought when Pierre Pierren was not actually putting 
bread on the table would defeat the purpose of the AFDC 
statute which is to aid "needy" children. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT CONTESTING 
THE AFDC REGULATION ON THE BASIS 
OF VAGUENESS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED 
BY THIS COURT SINCE IT RAISES 
A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WHICH MAY 
PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Responden~ in Point III of its bri~~ urges t~ 
.Court not to consider appellant's arguments concerning the 
vagueness of the AFDC regulations and forms, because the 
issue was not raised at the trial level. Appellant recognize 
the Court's reluctance to consider issues not raised at 
the trial level, but notes that case law·in Utah, as well 
as in its sister state of Montana, provides support for the 
Court to do so. The Montana Court in the case of In Re~ 
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Estate, 74 P.2d 401 (Mont. 1937) held that a constitutional 
question decisive of an appeal by the state on an inheritance 
tax matter could be considered even though the constitutional 
issue was first raised by the Court itself on appeal. The 
Court reached this decision despite the fact that, in its 
words, "the constitutional question was neither suggested, 
briefed or argued in the case prior to its submission for 
decision". In Re Clark's Estate, supra., at 405. 
~his Court has also considered whether a 
constitutional issue may be raised for the first time on 
appeal. In State v. Sheldon, 545 P.2d 513 (Ut. 1976), 
the Court declined to consider a constitutional issue on 
appeal since the transcript of the record did not reveal 
that the issue had been raised at the trial level. In a long 
dissent, Justice Maughan, relying in part on In Re Clark's 
Estate, argued that the Court should consider constitutional 
issues raised for the first time on appeal. Justice Maughan 
noted that the ordinance in question appeared on its face 
to raise a question of voidness for vagueness, a point 
especially relevant in view of the constitutional question 
appellant seeks to raise. 
Based on the previously cited cases, appellant 
urges the Court to consider its arguments concerning the 
vagueness of the regulation and implementing forms. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT AWARDING 
RESPONDENT $3,066.00 IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE LOWER COURT'S FINDI~G THAT 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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THE APPELLANT WAS INELIGIBLE 
FOR AFDC ASSISTANCE. 
In Point VI of its brief, respondent raises 
a cross-appeal contending that Judge Gould's holding which 
found the defendant ineligible for AFDC assistance from 
August 1976 to May 1977 is inconsistent with the judgment 
of $3,066.00. Respondent points out in its brief that 
at the time, the State of Utah was deducting amounts from 
appellant's AFDC assistance and purchasing food stamps 
_,; ,. J ~ 
for her. In view of the fact that the $1,014.00 deducted 
by the State from appellant's grant was used to purchase 
food stamps at a time when appellant was eligible for food 
stamps, the lower court's ruling on this particular point 
should be left in effect. Regardless of whether appellant's 
ex-husband was in her home, appellant was eligible for food 
stamps and her receipt from the State bF assistance of 
this kind is unaffected. 
POINT IV. 
IN THE ABSENCE OF A DEMONSTRATION 
OF LACK OF NEED, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN CANNOT BE 
REDUCED ON THE BASIS OF A PARENT'S·~~ 
COND.UCT. 
Respondent, in Point V of its brief, urges, in 
reliance on King v. Smith, supra. and Graham v. Shaffer, 
17 Ariz. App. 497, 498 P.2d 571 (1972), this Court to 
not consider that appellant, during the time period in 
question, was eligible for other financial assistance which 
would be unaffected by the presence or non-presence of her 
ex-husband, Pierre Pierren, in her home. Yet, the record Sponsor d by t e S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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in the case indicates that appellant was, in fact, eligble 
for such assistance, including: 
a. Stepchildren's Assistance; 
b. AFDC-Unemployed Parent Assistance (AFDC-UP) ; 
c. General Assistance; and 
d. Food Stamps. 
Again, appellants needy children should not be victimized 
by a recoupment of assistance from a mother who was eligible 
for assistance. 
Further, respondent's arguments ignore the 
cases cited in appellant's brief which establish that a 
recoupment cannot be made from an AFDC mother absent a 
showing of lack of need. This rule has recently been 
restated by the New York Supreme Court in Chan v. Blum, CCH 
Poverty Law Reporter, New Developments ,f 31, 10 8. For 
convenience, a summary of the decision is attached hereto 
as Appendix A. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the AFDC program is to aid needy 
.. - . 
-
children~. Appellan~ is an AFDC mother struggling to support 
four needy children without assistance from the fathers of 
the children. The State of Utah has apparently taken no 
action to collect child support payments which appellant 
has assigned to it. If allowed to stand, the District 
Court's decision will further add to the burden of appellant 
and her needy children. 
In this appeal, the Court has ample basis 
q 
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for correcting a condition which unfairly affects appellant 
and other AFDC mothers in Utah. Appellant urges the Court 
to rule in her favor so that the purpose of the AFDC 
program can be achieved. 
r 
DATED this 4th day of September, 1980. 
Respectfully Submitted: 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
~c~ 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered true and 
correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
to STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN, Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorney for Respondent, 150 West North Temple, Suite 234, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84103, this 4th day of September, 
1980. 
~~F~ 
MICHAEL E. BULSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
[1131,108) In the Applicatiuon of Pao 
Ching Chan v. Barbara Blum, etc., et al. New 
York Supreme Courl Appellate Division, Firsl 
Department. Memorandum Decision dated 
May 1, 1980. Before Sandler, P.J., and Ross, 
Silverman, Bloom and Carro, JJ. 
AFDC-Recoupment of 
Overpayments-Failure to Report Receipt 
of Social Security Benefits-Willfulness-
Lack of Need of Children.-The recoupment 
of a retroactive grant of social security 
benefits made to a family receiving AFDC 
benefits was annulled and New York welfare 
officials were directed to return to the mother 
any sums recouped or withheld pursuant to 
their recoupment decision. The mother and 
her minor children had received AFDC since 
May, 1975. In August, 1977, the mother had 
received retroactive social security benefits 
which she transferred to her sister in 
September to repay her for pre-welfare loans 
without informing the welfare agency. The 
determination of the state welfare 
commissioner upholding the right of the 
agency lo recoup the social security payments 
had been based on an alleged violation of 
regulatory provisions authorizing recoupment 
where there was evidence that the recipient 
had willfully withheld information about 
income or resources, and also authorizing 
recoupment of prior overpayments from 
current ·grants without regard to currently 
available income or resources where overpay-
ments were occasioned by willful withholding 
of information. Another regulation permitted 
recoupment only where the recipient was 
periodically notified of the obligation to report 
changes in income and resources and 
periodically acknowledged that the reporting 
obligations were called to her attention and 
were understood. 
However, in the absence of a 
demonstration of lack of need, financial 
assistance to dependent children under the 
AFDC program could not be reduced on the 
basis of a parent's conduct. Since there was no 
denonstration of lack of need in the record 
presented herein, it was error to order 
recoupment of the social security funds 
allocated lo the children. Moreover, as to the 
funds allocated to the mother, there was no 
substantial evidence that her failure to inform 
the city welfare agency of the retroactive 
social security payment was willful. There was 
no evidence whatever in the record that the 
mother, who was clearly shown by the record 
to be illiterate in the English language, had 
been periodically notified of her obligation to 
report changes in resources or had periodically 
acknowledged her understanding of that 
obligation as the applicable regulations 
required before rccoupment was authorized 
without regard to currently available income 
and resources. Under those circumstances, 
there was no basis for remanding for a new 
hearing to permit the welfare officials to 
attempt to supplement that deficiency in the 
record. Back reference: 1f 1610. 71. 
rt er. New DevR 1 onmPn +- q ~r 11 1 n Q 
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